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CONTRACT AND CONDITIONAL ZONING 
WITHOUT ROMANCE:  A PUBLIC 
CHOICE ANALYSIS 
Philip L. Fraietta* 
 
The growth and development of the United States after World War II left 
the country needing more flexibility in zoning law.  Over the past few 
decades, zoning has undergone drastic changes to make the process more 
flexible.  Two methods used to meet this new demand are contract and 
conditional zoning.  Jurisdictions are split on whether to permit contract 
zoning, conditional zoning, both, or neither.  This is an important question 
that a growing number of jurisdictions have recently encountered.  This 
Note seeks to propose potential solutions to the conflict by analyzing it 
through public choice theory.  By applying the principles of public choice 
theory, this Note finds that increased flexibility in zoning will likely have the 
undesired consequence of allowing legislators to easily appease interest 
groups, rather than bargain for the most efficient land use allocation.  
From this observation, this Note ultimately concludes that jurisdictions 
should either prohibit both contract and conditional zoning or, if economic 
efficiency concerns prove too great, permit both contract and conditional 
zoning but apply a strict standard of judicial review. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you own property in an area zoned residential by your town.  A 
power company wants to construct a new power plant adjacent to your 
property although the area is not zoned for it.  In furtherance of this desire, 
the power company offers the town eight million dollars to rezone the area, 
and the town subsequently rezones the property as requested.  This is 
essentially what happened to eight neighboring landowners in Durand v. 
IDC Bellingham, LLC1 and, perhaps counter intuitively, many jurisdictions 
find this practice entirely legal. 
 
 1. 793 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2003). 
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Zoning is a common and accepted practice in nearly every jurisdiction in 
the United States.2  Since the U.S. Supreme Court validated the practice in 
the landmark case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,3 its popularity 
and complexity has proceeded at a rapid pace. 
Early forms of zoning were thought to be too inflexible for the post–
World War II society, and thus zoning law has undergone various changes 
designed at increasing flexibility.4  One such change was the 
implementation of contract and conditional zoning.  Contract zoning is 
defined as “a bilateral agreement between a developer and legislative 
officials entered into as a condition for the rezoning of land which often 
involves the use of private covenants to restrict the land rezoned.”5  
Conditional zoning is defined as “zoning that places land in a temporary use 
classification that will become permanent only if the land is developed or 
certain events occur within a specified period of time.”6  States disagree on 
whether to allow either contract or conditional zoning, with some states 
opting to allow both, some opting to only allow conditional, some opting to 
allow neither, and others declining to decide on the matter.7  When viewed 
through public choice theory, contract and conditional zoning are 
concerning because they provide an easy way for interest groups to capture 
local government officials and ultimately have conditions attached that are 
inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of zoning.8  With the growing 
number of states that are accepting the practice, and many others sure to 
rule on it soon, it is important to provide an alternative lens through which 
to analyze the practice and its implications.9 
Public choice theory has been described by its late founder, James M. 
Buchanan, as “the avenue through which a romantic and illusory set of 
notions about the workings of governments and the behavior of persons 
who govern has been replaced by a set of notions that embody more 
skepticism about what governments can do and what governors will do.”10  
It relies primarily on three premises:  (1) that legislators, like every other 
individual, will seek to maximize their own utility (i.e., gain reelection);11 
(2) that voters will not serve as an adequate check on this due to their 
 
 2. See 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1:2 (5th ed. 2012). 
 3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 4. See 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 
§ 1:13–14 (4th ed. 2012). 
 5. See id. § 1:23. 
 6. See id. § 1:21. 
 7. See infra Part III.A–D. 
 8. See Hanna v. Bd. of Adjustment, 183 A.2d 539, 543 (Pa. 1962) (“A basic purpose of 
zoning is to ensure an orderly physical development of the city, borough, township or other 
community by confining particular uses of property to certain defined areas.  With such a 
purpose nonconforming uses are inconsistent.”). 
 9. See infra Part III.A–D for a discussion of the various positions states have taken on 
the issue. 
 10. James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance:  A Sketch of Positive Public Choice 
Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II 11, 11 (James 
M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984). 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
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“rational-ignorance”;12 and (3) that the “collective action problem” makes it 
difficult for majorities to form coalitions and thus easier for special interest 
groups to gain influence in the political process.13  The theory predicts this 
set of conditions will lead to legislators seeking to appease interest groups, 
as doing so maximizes their likelihood of reelection.14  This is particularly 
troublesome in the contract/conditional zoning realm because the discretion 
and flexibility individual legislators are given makes it easier for them to 
successfully appease interest groups at the potential detriment to the 
community at large.15 
This Note addresses the conflict between the states and offers an 
alternative analysis based on public choice theory.  To facilitate an 
understanding of zoning law—particularly contract and conditional 
zoning—Part I of this Note provides a historical overview of zoning law.  
Part II of this Note provides a detailed description of public choice theory.  
Part III details the conflict between the states and the various arguments 
advanced on all sides.  Part IV applies public choice principles to the 
conflict and concludes that states should shy away from both contract and 
conditional zoning, but also concludes that if the efficiency concerns are too 
great to eliminate the practices, states should impose a stricter standard of 
judicial review. 
I.  ZONING LAW GENERALLY 
A general understanding of zoning law is necessary to understand the 
policy concerns at play.  This part first details the history of the 
development of zoning.  It next describes the general requirements that 
must be met to implement a valid zoning plan.  It then explains the 
inadequacy of general rezoning.  It subsequently details contract and 
conditional zoning, particularly their rise to prominence.  Finally, it 
discusses the standard of judicial review for contract and conditional zoning 
decisions. 
A.  The History of Zoning 
“Zoning is the regulation by the municipality of the use of land within the 
community” in accordance with a general plan and for the purposes set 
forth in an enabling statute.16  Zoning grew out of the concept of public 
nuisance,17 which protects the rights of the public to be free from activities 
 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Part II.C–D. 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:3. 
 17. See David C. Keating, Exclusionary Zoning:  In Whose Interests Should the Police 
Power Be Exercised?, 23 REAL EST. L.J. 304, 304 (1995) (noting zoning’s roots as an 
extension of public nuisance doctrine); see also Thomas E. Raccuia, Note, RLUIPA and 
Exclusionary Zoning:  Government Defendants Should Have the Burden of Persuasion in 
Equal Terms Cases, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1858 (2012) (same). 
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that interfere with those rights.18  By the late nineteenth century, the failures 
of nuisance doctrine to regulate land use in an industrial society became 
evident as “residents in larger urban areas began to protest the loss of light 
and air as taller structures were . . . built.”19  Shortly after the construction 
of the forty-two story Equitable Building in Lower Manhattan, the pressure 
for additional controls on building height and form became clear, and New 
York City ultimately responded with the Zoning Resolution of 1916.20  The 
Resolution established height and setback controls, and designated 
residential districts that excluded perceived incompatible uses.21  The 
Resolution was not without controversy, however, and its constitutionality 
under the New York State Constitution was challenged in Lincoln Trust Co. 
v. Williams Building Corp.22  The court in Lincoln Trust ultimately 
approved the constitutionality of the Zoning Resolution on the grounds that 
zoning is “a proper exercise of the police power.”23  Following the Lincoln 
Trust decision, zoning became tremendously popular and spread quickly 
throughout the country.24 
The Lincoln Trust decision did not put the constitutionality question to 
rest, however, as some objected to zoning on the grounds that it violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by depriving persons of 
liberty and property without due process of law and denying equal 
protection of the law.25  The Supreme Court ended the debate by upholding 
zoning ordinances as a valid exercise of the state police power in Euclid.26  
After Euclid, “Euclidean,” or “use zoning,” became popular throughout the 
country.27 
Euclidean zoning refers to the “concept of separating incompatible land 
uses through the establishment of fixed legislative rules.”28  Although 
Euclidean zoning provided for changes and variances, it was envisioned 
that discretionary review of individual proposed uses would be the 
“exception” rather than the rule and that zoning restrictions would be 
uniform for each kind of building in each district.29  This concept proved to 
be very rigid and has resulted in the allowance for flexibility in the 
 
 18. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 14.2 (2d ed. 2007).  These acts are often those that 
injure the public health or safety but also include those that are contrary to public morals. 
See id. 
 19. 1 SALKIN, supra note 2, § 1:3. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. 128 N.E. 209 (N.Y. 1920). 
 23. Id. at 210. 
 24. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.3 (noting that, by the time of the 
Euclid decision, “some 564 cities and towns had enacted zoning” ordinances). 
 25. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend XIV. 
 26. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390 (“We find no difficulty in sustaining restrictions of the 
kind thus far reviewed.”). 
 27. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.3. 
 28. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:5. 
 29. See id. 
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development approval process.30  Two of the methods used to create 
flexibility are contract and conditional zoning, which is discussed in further 
detail below.31 
B.  Requirements Necessary for a Valid Zoning Ordinance 
This section outlines the uniform requirements necessary to implement a 
valid zoning ordinance.  First, it is important to note that municipalities 
themselves do not have police power.32  Police power is reserved for the 
state and not for its political subdivisions.33  Thus, a municipality can only 
exercise power “when it has specifically or impliedly received a delegation 
of such power from the state.”34  Application of this principle to zoning 
makes clear that the authority to enact zoning ordinances must be 
specifically delegated to municipalities in order for them to exercise the 
power to zone.35  Pursuant to this requirement, states issue enabling acts 
that grant the power for municipalities to zone.36   
All fifty states have adopted enabling acts that are substantially patterned 
after the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), a guideline resulting 
from the work of an Advisory Committee appointed by then–Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover.37  The SZEA:  (1) declares the purposes of 
zoning and defines its scope; (2) details a procedure for adopting zoning 
regulations and making amendments; (3) proposes the creation of a zoning 
commission; (4) permits the creation of a Board of Adjustment to hear 
appeals from enforcement of the ordinance, to decide special exceptions, 
and to give variances; and (5) contains provisions for the enforcement of the 
regulations.38  Regarding purpose, the SZEA separates into two categories:  
the first being the “grant of powers” category, and the second being the 
“purposes in view” category.39  The “grant of powers” category is based on 
section 1 of the SZEA, which states that the purpose of delegating the 
zoning power is to “promot[e] health, safety, morals, or the general welfare 
of the community.”40  The “purposes in view” category is based on section 
3 of the SZEA, which lists various purposes such as “to provide adequate 
light and air” and “to conserv[e] the value of buildings.”41 
 
 30. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 4.15. 
 31. See supra Part I.C. 
 32. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:8. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. § 1:9 (citing various state court decisions that hold that the power to zone 
must be specifically delegated); see also, e.g., Good Deal of Ivy Hill, Inc. v. City of Newark, 
160 A.2d 630, 632 (N.J. 1960); Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 296 (N.Y. 1972); 
Roeders v. City of Washburn, 298 N.W.2d 779, 782 (N.D. 1980). 
 36. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.6. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:12. 
 40. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.6. 
 41. See id. 
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Therefore, a zoning ordinance may be invalid if “it is beyond the power 
conferred by the enabling act”42 or if it was “exercised for [a] purpose[] 
beyond those expressed or implied in [the] enabling act.”43  Courts 
generally interpret zoning enabling acts as allowing for a wide array of land 
use controls and also generally defer to local legislative judgment as to 
what land use regulations are needed to promote the general welfare.44  
However, courts have refused to find that an enabling act confers a local 
community with plenary police power.45  This small limitation allows for 
courts to uphold conditional zoning “despite the lack of express language 
authorizing such a technique,”46 while simultaneously allowing courts to 
strike down zoning ordinances that are “unrelated to the achievement of 
land use objectives”47 because they would be zoning for a purpose that is 
“beyond the scope of the police power.”48  This liberalized standard helped 
facilitate the move from strict Euclidean zoning to more flexible rezoning 
measures and, subsequently, significantly enhanced the individual 
discretion of local officials in the operation of zoning codes.49 
C.  Inadequacy of General Rezoning and the Move to Flexible Rezoning 
Euclidean zoning “proved too rigid to meet changing community needs 
and development pressures.”50  These difficulties led to many rezoning 
requests, but change was difficult because of two competing concerns:  the 
protection of neighbors and environmentally sensitive lands versus the 
possibility of leaving land underused and of imposing unnecessary 
restrictions.51  Various techniques were developed over the years to address 
these flexibility concerns.52  Two of which were contract and conditional 
zoning. 
 
 42. Id. § 3.13. 
 43. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:12. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id.; see also, e.g., Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 364 
A.2d 1016, 1031 (N.J. 1976) (“[Z]oning is not a panacea for all social, cultural and economic 
ills especially where they are unrelated to the use of land.”) (citations omitted). 
 46. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.13; see also Giger v. City of 
Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Neb. 1989). 
 47. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.13; see also Belle Harbor Realty 
Corp. v. Kerr, 323 N.E.2d 697, 699 (N.Y. 1974) (holding that revocation of a permit to 
operate a nursing home “to assuage strident community opposition” was outside the enabling 
act); Cellular Tel. Co. v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 624 N.Y.S.2d 170, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) 
(holding that a moratorium imposed on cellular telephone antennas was outside the enabling 
act). 
 48. See, e.g., Robyns v. City of Dearborn, 67 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Mich. 1954) (stating 
that zoning exercised to lower the market value of property so that a governmental body 
could acquire it cheaper by eminent domain is unconstitutional); JUERGENSMEYER & 
ROBERTS, supra note 18, §3.13. 
 49. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:14. 
 50. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also Shelby D. Green, Development 
Agreements:  Bargained-For Zoning That Is Neither Illegal Contract nor Conditional 
Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 389 (2004). 
 51. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 4.15. 
 52. See id. 
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1.  Contract Zoning 
Contract zoning refers to “the process by which a local government 
enters into an agreement with a developer whereby the government exacts a 
performance or promise from the developer in exchange for its agreement 
to rezone the property.”53  Numerous state court decisions have found 
contract zoning to be illegal.54  Historically, courts had struck down the 
practice on the theories that it was an illegal bargaining away or abrogation 
of the police power,55 that it was inconsistent with uniformity 
requirements,56 and that it may lead to corruption or favoritism.57  Today, 
by contrast, courts have warmed to the idea of contract zoning and often 
distinguish between illegal contract zoning and valid conditional zoning.58  
The modern trend is that “illegal contract zoning is likely to be found only 
where there is an express bilateral agreement that bargains away the 
municipality’s future use of the police power.”59 
An example of a court finding an express bilateral agreement that 
bargains away the municipality’s future use of the police power is the 
Florida case Chung v. Sarasota County.60  In Chung, an adjacent landowner 
challenged a settlement agreement reached by a landowner and the county 
in an action disputing the county’s initial refusal to rezone the landowner’s 
parcel.61  The settlement agreement required the county to rezone the parcel 
subject to numerous stipulations and conditions.62  The court concluded that 
the settlement agreement constituted a case of improper contract zoning 
because the county had “contracted away the exercise of its police power, 
which constituted an ultra vires act.”63  The Chung case, therefore, is an 
example of a court finding contract zoning illegal on the basis of a bilateral 
agreement that bargains away the police power. 
 
 53. 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:11. 
 54. See, e.g., V.F. Zahodiakin Eng’g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127, 
131 (N.J. 1952) (holding that contract zoning is an illegal bargaining away of the police 
power); City of Farmers Branch v. Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1968) (stating the same); see also 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:11 n.2 (listing other 
decisions). 
 55. See 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:11 n.2 (listing decisions). 
 56. See, e.g., Campion v. Bd. of Aldermen, 859 A.2d 586, 601 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004); 
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 501 A.2d 489, 493 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1985). 
 57. See City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 263 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1953) (stating that 
contract zoning destroys “that confidence in the integrity and discretion of public action 
which is essential to the preservation of civilized society.” (quoting Osborne v. Allen, 226 
S.W. 221, 224 (Tenn. 1920))). 
 58. See 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:11. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 686 So.2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 61. See id. at 1359. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. at 1360. 
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2.  Conditional Zoning 
Conditional zoning refers to the imposition of conditions on proposed 
developments.64  Conditional zoning can happen in one of two ways:  
(1) the conditions can be attached administratively in the special permit or 
variance process; or (2) conditions can be attached in a rezoning process.65  
This Note only addresses the second. 
When conditions are attached by way of rezoning, conditional zoning is 
very similar to contract zoning.66  Many courts distinguish the two, 
however, on the grounds that contract zoning bargains away a 
municipality’s police power, while conditional zoning does not.67  
Conditional rezoning is therefore upheld in the majority of jurisdictions as 
long as:  “(1) [it] promotes the general welfare and not merely private 
interests; (2) the rezoning does not otherwise constitute illegal spot zoning; 
(3) the conditions imposed are reasonable and not otherwise illegal; and 
(4) there is no express agreement bargaining away a municipality’s future 
use of the police power.”68 
A recent example of the willingness of courts to uphold unilateral 
conditional zoning is the Massachusetts case Durand v. IDC Bellingham, 
LLC.69  In Durand, the town of Bellingham developed a proposal to rezone 
certain land from “agricultural” and “suburban” to “industrial use” in order 
to increase its tax base.70  The proposal ultimately fell eight votes short of 
the required two-thirds majority at a town meeting.71  Two years later, IDC 
Bellingham, LLC discussed rezoning the land so that a power plant could 
be built on it.72  The Town Administrator told IDC officials that the town 
was eight million dollars short of what was required to construct a new high 
school.73  IDC responded by publicly announcing that it would make an 
 
 64. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.11. 
 65. See id.; see also 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:12. 
 66. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:12. 
 67. See, e.g., Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 369 (Mass. 2003); 
Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683 (N.Y. 1960); Chrismon v. Guilford Cnty., 370 
S.E.2d 579, 594 (N.C. 1988).  The Supreme Court of New Mexico drew a different 
distinction between contract and conditional zoning.  That court found that  
contract zoning is illegal whenever it arises from a promise by a municipality to 
zone property in a certain manner, i.e., when a municipality is either a party to a 
bilateral contract to zone or when a municipality is a party to a unilateral contract 
in which the municipality promises to rezone . . . [such a] contract . . . is illegal 
because, in making such a promise, a municipality preempts the power of the 
zoning authority to zone the property according to prescribed legislative 
procedures.   
Dacy v. Vill. of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793, 797 (N.M. 1992). 
 68. 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:12.  For examples of courts applying this doctrinal 
test, see supra note 67. 
 69. 793 N.E.2d 359. 
 70. Id. at 361. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
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eight million dollar gift to the town if IDC could build the plant.74  While 
the offer clearly was made with regards to the high school, IDC stated the 
town could use the money for “any municipal purpose.”75  In response to 
the offer, the town held another meeting, and this time the rezoning was 
approved by two-thirds vote.76  The plaintiffs, eight neighboring 
landowners, filed suit against IDC, the town, the town zoning board of 
appeals, and the owner of the property, alleging the rezoning constituted 
illegal contract zoning.77  The court held that the eight million dollar offer 
did not constitute contract zoning because voters at the town meeting were 
not “bound to approve the zoning change.”78  In other words, the agreement 
was unilateral.  The court further held that a “voluntary offer of public 
benefits is not, standing alone, an adequate ground on which to void an 
otherwise valid rezoning.”79  The court concluded that there is generally no 
reason to invalidate an otherwise valid rezoning because “[it] defer[s] to 
legislative findings and choices without regard to motive.”80  The Durand 
case, therefore, provides an example of a court upholding conditional 
zoning on the theory that it is unilateral and of showing high deference to 
the legislature in these matters. 
D.  Judicial Review of Contract and Conditional Zoning 
Provisions for judicial review of zoning decisions differ by state.  
However, many states authorize an appeal from a local zoning board under 
the same procedures available for appeals from state administrative 
agencies.81  The SZEA provides for review of decisions of the board of 
adjustment by petition to a court of record alleging why the board decision 
is illegal.82  The Act states that “[a]ny person . . . aggrieved by any decision 
of the board of adjustment, or any taxpayer,”83 as well as “proper local 
authorities of the municipality,”84 may petition the court.  This standard has 
led courts to recognize standing for (1) owners of property that is the 
subject of the dispute, (2) persons who have interest in property that adjoins 
property directly affected by the zoning decision, (3) associations acting as 
an agent for members who own property or reside in the area, and (4) local 
governments aggrieved by the zoning decision.85  Although SZEA provides 
 
 74. See id. at 361–62. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. at 362–63. 
 78. Id. at 366. 
 79. Id. at 368. 
 80. Id. at 369. 
 81. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.32. 
 82. See A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY 
ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS § 7 (1926), available at http://www.planning.org/
growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.pdf. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. § 8. 
 85. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.34. 
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that “any taxpayer” may petition the court,86 not all courts have found this 
to provide automatic standing for all taxpayers.87 
Courts have struggled to develop standards of review that protect from 
abuses of power, while not overly interfering with the legislative process.88  
Despite the confusion, the standard can best be broken down into two 
categories:  review of legislative acts and review of administrative acts.89 
1.  Legislative Acts 
Courts traditionally accord legislative actions a strong presumption of 
validity.90  This strong presumption of validity means courts typically use a 
rational basis test to assess validity in contract/conditional zoning.91  
Rational basis review requires a law to be “reasonable, not arbitrary and [to] 
bear[] . . . a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective.”92  In 
recent decades, however, courts have expressed dissatisfaction with 
granting such high deference to local legislative authorities and instead 
subject them to greater scrutiny.93  Although courts have yet to deviate from 
rational basis review with regards to contract or conditional zoning, in the 
analogous situation of “spot zoning,”94 some courts find that its quasi-
 
 86. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 87. Compare Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 676 A.2d 831, 838 (Conn. 1996) 
(declining to overrule precedent that taxpayers have automatic standing), with Comm. for 
Responsible Dev. on 25th St. v. Mayor of Balt., 767 A.2d 906, 915 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2001) (holding that “taxpayers must be aggrieved in order to seek judicial review”). 
 88. See Robert J. Hopperton, Standards of Judicial Review in Supreme Court Land Use 
Opinions:  A Taxonomy, an Analytical Framework and a Synthesis, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 1, 98 (1997) (noting that there is “no set formula” for the standards of judicial 
review but instead “[c]onfusion, disarray, and inconsistency”); see also JUERGENSMEYER & 
ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.37. 
 89. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.37. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be 
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”).  For a more detailed discussion of rational basis review, see Richard B. Saphire, 
Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 
KY. L.J. 591, 603–08 (2000). 
 93. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 476 (Fla. 1993) (holding that 
the zoning board has the burden to show that its decision “is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
unreasonable”). 
 94. “[S]pot-zoning refers to the singling out of a lot or a small area for discriminatory or 
different treatment from that accorded surrounding land which is similar in character.” 
Willot v. Vill. of Beachwood, 197 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ohio 1964) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 11:5.  This Note treats spot zoning analogously 
to contract/conditional zoning because of the high discretion awarded to policymakers in 
both. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also Hedrich v. Vill. of Niles, 250 
N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (noting the danger of “bartering . . . legislative 
discretion” (emphasis added)); Green, supra note 50, at 404 n.114 (noting the similarities 
between contract zoning and spot zoning). 
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judicial nature disqualifies it from deferential review.95  The leading case in 
favor of this position comes from the Oregon Supreme Court in Fasano v. 
Board of County Commissioners.96  In Fasano, the county commissioners 
rezoned a thirty-two acre tract from single-family use to mobile home use, 
and the neighbors challenged the rezoning.97  The defendant board asserted 
the presumption of validity and argued that the challengers must show their 
decision was arbitrary.98  The court, however, rejected to extend to the 
board the presumption of validity, holding that doing so would be “ignoring 
reality” that local decision groups are not the equivalent of state and 
national legislatures.99  The court felt it was justified in not extending the 
presumption because of “the almost irresistible pressures that can be 
asserted by private economic interests on local government.”100  The 
Fasano court did not go so far as to state all acts of local governments 
should not be given the presumption of validity, but instead drew a 
distinction between actions that are of a legislative character and actions 
that are of a quasi-judicial character.101  If the action is legislative in 
character, judicial deference is appropriate.102  If, on the other hand, it is 
quasi-judicial in character, as the court found site-specific rezoning 
classifications to be, then judicial deference is not appropriate.103  Fasano 
has been met with mixed reaction around the country, with numerous states 
following it, and others specifically rejecting it.104 
a.  Jurisdictions That Use Fasano Review 
The American Law Institute (ALI) was quick to adopt Fasano review in 
its Model Development Code.105 The ALI agreed with the Fasano court 
that local legislatures are not equal in all respects to state and national 
legislatures and that rezoning is an administrative, not a legislative, 
function.106 
 
 95. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.37. 
 96. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). 
 97. See id. at 25. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. at 26. 
 100. Id. at 30.  This analysis borrows in large part from James Madison’s concern that the 
legislative process is vulnerable to capture by factions who act without regard for others. See 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).  It also borrows from public choice theory. See 
infra Part II. 
 101. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26–27. 
 102. See id. at 26. 
 103. See id. at 26–27. 
 104. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.9. Compare Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 475 (Fla. 1993) (adopting Fasano review and finding 
rezoning subject to “strict scrutiny”), and Cooper v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 614 P.2d 947, 
949–50 (Idaho 1980) (adopting Fasano review), with Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 
21 P.3d 833, 836 (Alaska 2001) (rejecting Fasano and finding spot zoning to be “an 
arbitrary exercise of legislative power”), and Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 618 P.2d 601, 602 
(Ariz. 1980) (rejecting the view that rezoning is not a legislative function). 
 105. See MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-312(2) (1975). 
 106. See id. 
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Following adoption by the ALI, numerous states began to follow Fasano 
as well.107  One of the first states to do so was Idaho in Cooper v. Board of 
County Commissioners.108  In Cooper, the plaintiff-appellants bought 
roughly ninety-nine acres of land that had a D-2 zoning classification, 
which permitted a maximum density of one home per acre.109  The 
appellants applied to rezone the property to an R-5 classification, which 
would allow two residential units per acre if either a central sewage facility 
or central water facility were available, and three residential units per acre if 
both facilities were available.110  After two hearings and deliberation, the 
board voted to deny the rezoning.111  Appellants then brought suit in the 
state district court, where the court applied rational basis review and found 
that since the board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its decision, the 
decision was valid.112   
On appeal, appellants argued that the district court erred in characterizing 
the action as legislative and instead should have considered the action as 
“an administrative, quasi-judicial determination of individual rights.”113  
The court explained the Fasano distinction between legislative acts and 
quasi-judicial acts and ultimately held that characterizing the action of a 
zoning body as quasi-judicial “in applying general rules or policies to 
specific individuals, interests, or situations represent[s] the better rule.  The 
shield from meaningful judicial review which the legislative label provides 
is inappropriate in these highly particularized land use decisions.”114  The 
court went on to explain that the rationale for granting deferential review to 
legislative action—that legislators are freely elected by the people and can 
be removed115—was inapposite when applied to a local zoning body’s 
decision as to the fate of an individual’s application to rezone, because 
“[m]ost voters are unaware or unconcerned that fair dealing and consistent 
treatment may have been sacrificed in the procedural informality which 
accompanies action deemed legislative.”116  In other words, the Cooper 
court felt voters were an inadequate check on the board with respect to 
rezoning, and it was necessary for the court to apply a stricter review in 
order to provide an adequate check.117 
 
 107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 108. 614 P.2d 947 (Idaho 1980). 
 109. See id. at 947. 
 110. See id. at 948. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 949. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. at 950. 
 115. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (stating 
that the people’s “rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, 
by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule”). 
 116. Cooper, 614 P.2d at 950. 
 117. See id. at 951 (“To allow the discretion of local zoning bodies to remain virtually 
unlimited in the determination of individual rights is to condone government by men rather 
than government by law.  Accordingly, we adopt the rule which distinguishes between 
legislative and quasi-judicial actions of local zoning bodies . . . .”). 
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Roughly a decade after Cooper, the Florida Supreme Court adopted 
Fasano in what has become a leading case in its favor—Board of County 
Commissioners v. Snyder.118  In Snyder, the respondents owned a one-half-
acre parcel of property that was zoned GU (general use), which allowed for 
construction of a single-family residence.119  The respondents filed an 
application to rezone the property to the RU-2-15 classification, which 
allows the construction of fifteen units per acre.120  After the application 
was filed, the Brevard County Planning and Zoning staff reviewed the 
application and concluded that the proposed multifamily use was consistent 
with all aspects of the comprehensive zoning plan, except that it was 
located in a flood plain on which a maximum of only two units per acre was 
allowed and therefore recommended the request be denied.121  The 
Commission subsequently voted to deny the rezoning request without 
stating a reason why, even after the respondents stated that they intended to 
build only five or six units on the property.122  The respondents then filed 
suit in the circuit court, where their petition was denied, but won on appeal 
in the Fifth District Court of Appeal.123  The Fifth District opted to adopt 
Fasano review and found that the respondent’s application for rezoning was 
consistent with the comprehensive plan so that there was no stated reason 
for the denial.124 
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether to 
adopt Fasano review.125  The court found that comprehensive rezonings 
affecting a large portion of the public are legislative in nature and, 
therefore, are granted a presumption of validity, but found that rezoning 
actions that (1) have a limited impact, (2) are contingent on a fact arrived at 
from distinct alternatives presented at a hearing, and (3) can be viewed as 
“policy application, rather than policy setting” are by nature quasi-
judicial.126  Due to their quasi-judicial nature, the court found they should 
be subject to strict scrutiny.127 
b.  Jurisdictions That Have Rejected Fasano 
Some jurisdictions have rejected Fasano review.128  One early example 
is Arizona in Wait v. City of Scottsdale.129  In Wait, the lead appellant was a 
doctor who had purchased a five-acre parcel of land that was zoned R1-43 
(singe family residential, one house per acre) and wanted to rezone it to an 
 
 118. 627 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1993). 
 119. See id. at 471. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. at 471–72. 
 125. See id. at 472. 
 126. Id. at 474. 
 127. Id. at 475. 
 128. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 129. 618 P.2d 601 (Ariz. 1980). 
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S-R zoning classification (service residential) that would allow him to 
construct a personal office building on the property.130  The city zoning 
staff recommended that the rezoning request be denied for a number of 
reasons—one being that it would be contrary to the city’s General Land Use 
Plan.131  The city’s Planning and Zoning Commission disagreed with the 
staff recommendation and approved the application by a four-to-three vote, 
which sent it to the City Council for approval.132  The City Council 
unanimously voted to deny the rezoning and the appellants filed suit.133  
The appellants argued that the act of rezoning is a quasi-judicial function 
and therefore not subject to rational basis review.134  The court noted that 
their position was in the minority and held that rezoning is a legislative 
function.135  Applying rational basis review, the court acknowledged that 
the appellants argument—the diminution in value of their property 
outweighs the public need to maintain the current zoning—was important, 
but found that the appellants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating 
that the R1-43 zoning classification was arbitrary and capricious.136 
In a more recent leading case, Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, the 
Supreme Court of Alaska rejected Fasano.137  In Cabana, the Kenai 
Peninsula Borough traded a forty-acre parcel for a twenty-acre parcel with a 
purchaser looking to use the forty-acre parcel to store and process gravel to 
be sold to customers in the area.138  The Kenai Peninsula Borough Code 
required that land owned by the borough must be classified before it can be 
sold.139  In accordance with this requirement, the Borough Planning 
Commission held a public hearing and eventually recommended a light 
industrial classification for the parcel with a variance permitting material 
stockpiling and related activities.140  The Kenai Peninsula Borough 
Assembly then held a public hearing on the proposed classification and, 
despite some objections, passed a resolution classifying the parcel as light 
 
 130. Id. at 602. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (“The enactment of the original zoning ordinance is a legislative function, and we 
fail to see why the amendment of an ordinance should be of a different character.  We accept 
the majority view that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances constitute 
legislative action.  Since we hold that the decision to rezone is a legislative one, neither the 
motives of the councilmen in denying the application for rezoning nor the reasons that were 
spread before them to induce the denial of the rezoning request are proper subjects for 
judicial inquiry.”). 
 136. See id. at 603.  The court based its decision on the fact that zoning is “much more 
than mere classification of a particular piece of property.” Id.  The court noted that zoning 
“[a]mong other things . . . involves consideration of future growth and development, public 
streets, pedestrian walkways, drainage and sewage, increased traffic flow, [and] surrounding 
property values.” Id. 
 137. 21 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2001). 
 138. Id. at 834. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 835. 
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industrial.141  The appellants, led by Cabana, challenged the resolution 
arguing that it violated various procedural and statutory requirements, and 
that it constituted “spot zoning.”142  The appellants further argued that the 
Borough Assembly’s classification was a quasi-judicial proceeding and thus 
not subject to deferential review.143  The court disagreed, holding that 
small-scale rezonings are legislative decisions.144  The court, relying on 
past precedent, held spot zoning is “the legal term of art for a zoning 
decision which affects a small parcel of land and which is found to be an 
arbitrary exercise of legislative power.”145  Therefore, “[j]ust as the act of 
spot zoning is a legislative act, the decision to spot zone is a legislative 
decision.”146 
2.  Administrative Acts 
Most states accord administrative zoning actions with a presumption of 
validity.147  The justification for deference lies in the judgment that board 
members are experts whom courts should trust or that they are more 
familiar with local conditions than the reviewing court.148  However, it is 
common for judges, after reciting the presumption of validity and stating  
“they will not overturn an administrative ruling unless it is arbitrary or 
capricious,” to sometimes engage in a review that is less deferential than 
standard rational basis review for legislative action.149  Generally, 
substantial evidence must support an administrative action, and thus the 
board must make findings so that “the court can assure itself that the board 
acted properly.”150 
II.  PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 
This part provides a general, but detailed, framework of public choice 
theory.  It begins by discussing the theories of self-interested legislators and 
rationally ignorant voters.  It next discusses the interest group theory of 
government and the collective action problem.  Then, it applies public 
choice theory to local politics by first examining whether the rational-
ignorance effect is present in local politics and whether interest groups have 
influence in the zoning process.  Finally, it distinguishes public choice 
theory from corruption. 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. at 835–36. 
 145. Id. at 836. (quoting Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015, 1020 n.6 (Alaska 
1996)). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.37(B). 
 148. Id. 
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 150. Id.; see also, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 7.16.120(4)–(5) (1989). 
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James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock effectively founded public 
choice theory with their work The Calculus of Consent:  Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.151  Public choice theory begins 
with the assumption that policymakers, like all individuals, are motivated 
by self-interest or, in economic terms, “utility maximization.”152  This 
assumption allows for economists to apply economics to political decision 
making.153  Three important factors distinguish decision making in the 
political arena from a typical market transaction.  First, rather than spending 
dollars, which are allocated unevenly, in the political arena people express 
their preferences (or “spend”) with votes, which are usually distributed 
evenly.  Second, voting takes place in the context of other voters whose 
preferences will affect the eventual outcome, unlike a typical market 
transaction where the outcome is determined solely by the buyer and seller.  
Third, preferences are often expressed through intermediaries, usually 
elected officials.154  In order to better understand how each of these factors 
affects the analysis, a basic understanding of the economic principles used 
is needed. 
A.  Self-Interested Legislators 
A primary concern of public choice theory is “the agency costs that lead 
government officials to make decisions in their own interests, which may 
diverge from that of their constituents.”155  Given the assumption that 
legislators are rational self-interest maximizers, it should be expected that 
their primary interest is not pursuing the “common good.”156  Because the 
political arena is not like a typical market, profit maximization cannot 
simply be pegged to monetary profit.  Instead, it is thought the profit-
maximizing action of the legislator or administrator is to maximize her 
likelihood of reelection or reappointment, as failure to do so will result in 
the loss of whatever benefits come from holding office.157  This assumption 
is supported by empirical evidence showing that, in Senate reelection 
campaigns, candidates tend to move toward the positions held by the most 
 
 151. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:  LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962). 
 152. See id. at 19–20. 
 153. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979). 
 154. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 378–79 (4th ed. 
2007); see also JAMES D. GWARTNEY, ET AL., ECONOMICS:  PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 
126–27 (12th ed. 2009) (discussing the differences between governments and markets). 
 155. See Stewart E. Sterk, Structural Obstacles to Settlement of Land Disputes, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 227, 248 (2011). 
 156. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 151, at 19–20. 
 157. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 873, 891 (1987); see also GWARTNEY ET AL., supra note 154, at 130 (“Just as 
profits are the lifeblood of the market entrepreneur, votes are the lifeblood of the 
politician.”). 
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recently elected Senator in the state.158  The desire to get reelected could 
lead to two possible outcomes:  (1) the legislator makes sure that the 
legislation she supports is, on average, legislation that is supported by a 
majority of her constituents; or (2) the legislator supports legislation that 
will get her approval of interest groups that can provide information about 
the candidate to the public, thus increasing the odds that those inclined to 
support the legislator will actually vote.159  It should be noted that this 
model has been criticized for offering too simplistic an explanation of 
legislative voting.160  Despite being generally supportive of public choice 
theory, Professors Farber and Frickey argue that ideology plays an 
important role in legislative voting and therefore propose a model that 
accounts for ideology.161  Whether or not ideology should play a role is 
beyond the scope of this Note and its basic outline of public choice theory. 
Accounting for ideology, however, will not change the analysis or solutions 
proposed by this Note in Part IV. 
B.  Rationally Ignorant Voters 
Another pillar of public choice theory is its conception of the “rationally 
ignorant” voter.162  Anthony Downs first developed the theory in his 
political science treatise, An Economic Theory of Democracy.163  The 
theory asserts, as Downs phrased it, that “it is irrational to be politically 
well-informed because the low returns from data simply do not justify their 
cost in time and other scarce resources.”164  To summarize, voters are 
rational maximizers of self-interest and thus compare the costs and benefits 
of voting.  Since the time required to gather political information has an 
“opportunity cost,”165 and since it is extraordinarily unlikely that one 
individual vote will change the outcome of an election, the cost of voting 
outweighs the marginal benefit—often times zero.166  It is therefore 
“rational for voters to remain ignorant of the political process.”167  This 
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rational ignorance empowers interest groups to “capture” the political 
process.168 
C.  The Interest Group Theory of Government 
Special interest groups exist to further the interests of their members.169  
Public choice theory defines a special interest as “one that generates 
substantial personal benefits for a relatively small number of constituents, 
while simultaneously imposing a small individual cost on a much larger, 
unidentified group of voters.”170  The economic analysis of interest groups 
is relatively straightforward and can be stated in conventional supply and 
demand terms.171  “The demand for transfers is based upon the 
organizational costs facing potential interest groups.”172  A successful 
interest group will be one that can organize in a cost-efficient manner.173  
The “supply” of transfers is simply the inverse—that is, those for whom it 
would cost more than one dollar to organize to resist losing one dollar in the 
political process.174  Without government coercion, the “supply” would not 
exist; hence, political agents facilitate the process of wealth transfers.175  
Political agents, motivated by the desire to get reelected, supply legislation 
that concentrates benefits on special interest groups in an attempt to put 
together a majority coalition of these groups.176  Although the benefits 
forwarded to the special interest groups will likely be outweighed by the 
costs to the voting populace at large, the latter are unlikely to be politically 
active because of the rational-ignorance phenomenon explained earlier.177  
Evidence of this assertion is suggested by studies that have concluded New 
Deal spending by state was far more directly linked to the number of 
electoral votes and the probability of winning the state than to the perceived 
“need” for New Deal programs.178 
1.  Drawback of Interest Groups:  Rent-Seeking 
One concern regarding interest groups is the that government officials 
will respond to their “rent-seeking”179 and the result will be inefficient 
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regulation combined with inefficient expenditure of resources to achieve 
that regulation.180 
Williamson v. Lee Optical181 is perhaps the best-known legal case of 
rent-seeking.182  In Williamson, the Supreme Court reviewed an Oklahoma 
statute, which prohibited opticians from providing lenses or eyeglass frames 
without a prescription.183  The practical effect was that no optician could fit 
old glasses into new frames or supply a lens—whether it be a new lens or 
one to duplicate a lost or broken lens—without a prescription.184  The 
Supreme Court ultimately held that the legislation was not a denial of due 
process.185  Relevant to the rent-seeking inquiry, however, is the fact that 
the optometrists heavily supported the legislation, and its intended 
economic effects were to limit competition in the market for eyeglasses and, 
thereby, increase the prices optometrists could charge.186  Because this 
price increase is artificially created by the regulation, it is regarded as a 
form of “rent.”187 
The Williamson case therefore exemplifies the dangers of rent-seeking.  
The Supreme Court called the resulting regulation “needless” and 
“wasteful,”188 but nevertheless it provided a great benefit to optometrists, 
who heavily supported its passage.189 
2.  Benefit of Interest Groups 
There are, however, some benefits of interest group government.  One 
such example is the development of factory legislation in the nineteenth 
century.190  Despite conventional wisdom, public-interest motives likely did 
not lead to foreclosing children from textile industry jobs.191  Instead, it has 
been argued that the owners of steam-driven mills lobbied for the 
legislation in order to increase their wealth by restricting competition from 
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water-driven mills, which operated longer hours and employed more 
children.192  Furthermore, labor interests, particularly male spinner 
operatives, also opposed the employment of children, in order to limit 
competition for their jobs.193  So, ultimately these rent-seeking efforts 
resulted in a societal and institutional change.194 
D.  The Collective Action Problem 
The intuitive response to the interest group theory of government is that 
voter majorities can outweigh numerically smaller interest groups.  In order 
for this to hold true, however, it must be true that group action and 
individual action are analytically similar, so that rational individuals will 
aggregate into rational majority voting groups.195  Mancur Olson proved 
this widely held assumption false in his work The Logic of Collective 
Action:  Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.196  Olson argued that 
individual rationality does not imply collective rationality, especially in 
larger groups.197  Olson’s main support for this argument is what is known 
as the “free-rider problem.”198  The free-rider problem occurs when an 
individual takes advantage of the benefits of the activities of others without 
paying for those benefits.199  This naturally leads to the conclusion that in 
the case of organizing a group, each individual would like to contribute a 
suboptimal amount because the entire group will share the benefits of her 
expenditure.200  Thus, as Olson argues, rational individuals “will not act to 
achieve their common or group interests,” as doing so allows other to free-
ride off of their efforts.201  Olson further contends that smaller groups can 
sometimes effectively organize around the free-rider problem using 
“informal arrangements and peer pressure.”202  Larger groups, by contrast, 
typically require “formal institutions and selective incentives to organize 
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 193. See id. at 367. 
 194. See id. at 367–68. 
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and act collectively.”203  When coupled with the fact that voters are likely 
to be ignorant of political issues,204 the instinctive conclusion is that 
individuals will not be able to effectively organize in large groups to 
override the influence of smaller interest groups.205 
E.  Rational Ignorance in Local Politics? 
The economist William A. Fischel has provided a strong counter 
argument to the rational-ignorance theory with regard to local politics.206  
Fischel begins by analogizing municipalities to business corporations.207  In 
Fischel’s model, the homeowner, like the shareholder, wants the 
municipality to maximize her asset value.208  However, unlike the 
shareholder, the homeowner cannot diversify her assets and therefore bears 
an inordinate amount of risk in owning her home.209  Additionally, unlike 
the shareholder, the homeowner often cannot simply sell at a loss as a result 
of poor management because the homeowner has a large portion of her 
wealth tied up in the property.210  This, Fischel argues, leads to 
homeowners being more cautious about their decision to sell than almost 
any other transaction.211  Homeowners, as a product of their decreased 
mobility, therefore have a high incentive to be informed about local politics 
and to organize to prevent local laws that decrease home values.212 
Critics of Fischel point out that voter participation is generally 
significantly lower in purely local elections than in national elections.213  
Fischel, however, argues that lower political participation could be a sign of 
local voter satisfaction214 and that a serious controversy could significantly 
increase local voter turnout.215  For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient 
to simply acknowledge the arguments on both sides. 
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Fischel’s analysis could also be read as endorsing the interest group 
theory of government if homeowners are thought of as a “group,” as some 
commentators suggest they should be.216  In this paradigm, homeowners 
can be thought of as a highly successful and influential interest group in 
local politics.217 
F.  Interest Groups and Zoning 
There is evidence to suggest that interest groups are active in the zoning 
context.218  In a 2005 study, researchers surveyed city council members 
from sixty-eight medium-sized (defined as cities with a population of 
100,000–300,000) American cities.219  The results showed that 57 percent 
of respondents felt interest groups were “very active” in zoning, while 36 
percent felt they were “somewhat active,” and only 8 percent felt they were 
“not at all” active.220  Furthermore, 46 percent of those surveyed felt 
interest groups were “very” influential in zoning, while 45 felt they were 
“somewhat” influential, and only 9 percent felt they were “not at all” 
influential.221  The study thus provides strong evidence that interest groups 
take an active and influential role in zoning. 
Interest groups have also begun to see the potential for conditional 
zoning to help them achieve their goals.  A recent project by the Center for 
Law and the Public’s Health at Johns Hopkins & Georgetown Universities 
found that conditional zoning could be used in an effort to ban or restrict 
fast food outlets.222  The authors argue that since most courts will uphold 
conditional zoning so long as it is in the public interest,223 and promoting 
public health is undoubtedly in the public interest, conditional zoning is a 
viable avenue to use to restrict fast food outlets.224 
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G.  Public Choice Versus Corruption 
Public choice factors should not be treated the same as standard 
corruption.225  Quid pro quo politics differ from bribery, fraud, and self-
dealing in three ways.226  First, a political system that encourages 
legislators to represent the interests of their constituents may also provide 
an incentive to monitor those legislators for standard corruption.227  Second, 
strict rules on legal donations may simply drive those donations 
underground, thus it is important to maintain a distinction between 
donations and illegal, secret gifts.228  Third, some reform proposals 
designed to counter corruption involve the use of legal incentive payments, 
and mixing financial incentives with the provision of public services is 
always corrupt.229  Therefore, it is important to remember for the purposes 
of this Note that legislators responding to self-interest incentives should not 
be understood in the same way as typical corruption is.  Typical corruption 
can be countered with prosecution, institutional reforms, and more effective 
policing.230  Public choice factors, by contrast, are inherent in the system 
and, therefore, a far more complicated restructuring of the political 
decision-making rules is likely necessary to combat them.231 
III.  CONTRACT ZONE?  CONDITIONAL ZONE?  BOTH?  NEITHER? 
Jurisdictions are currently split on whether to allow contract and 
conditional zoning, only conditional zoning, or neither.  This part outlines 
the conflict and explains the arguments forwarded by all sides in order to 
later analyze them through a public choice perspective.  It begins with 
jurisdictions that only allow conditional zoning, then proceeds to 
jurisdictions that allow both.  It next proceeds to jurisdictions that allow 
neither, and concludes with jurisdictions that have declined to rule on the 
issue. 
A.  Jurisdictions That Only Allow Conditional Zoning 
The modern trend is for jurisdictions to allow unilateral conditional 
zoning, but invalidate bilateral contract zoning.232  The justification for this 
distinction is that it provides needed flexibility without allowing a 
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bargaining away of the police power.233  Professor Judith Welch Wegner 
has suggested that the distinction has little practical meaning and instead 
serves primarily to describe the ultimate outcome and create an apparent 
dichotomy of classification, without fully considering the potential 
overlap.234  Nevertheless, it is accepted as the modern trend.235 
1.  History of the Modern Trend and the Words of Economic Commentators 
The history of how the modern trend emerged is important.  Initially, 
courts and academics were hostile to the idea of contract zoning.236  Some 
courts struck down the practice as an illegal bargaining away or abrogation 
of the police power.237  Others struck down the practice as inconsistent with 
uniformity requirements.238  And others rejected the practice for fear of 
corruption or favoritism.239 
Despite the then general rejection of the practice, New York expressed its 
approval of contract zoning in Church v. Town of Islip.240  In Church, 
neighboring property owners brought suit against the Town of Islip and 
against its Town Board to have a zoning change from a Residence A 
classification to a Business classification voided as unconstitutional.241  The 
neighbors contended that the rezoning was illegal contract zoning because 
the Town Board’s consent to the rezoning was subject to various 
conditions.242  The court recognized the growing population of Suffolk 
County and held that, “[s]ince the Town Board could have . . . zoned [the] 
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corner for business without any restrictions, we fail to see how reasonable 
conditions invalidate the legislation.”243 
The Church court set the stage for the movement toward conditional 
zoning, and its decision was followed by commentators writing in support 
of the practice on economic efficiency grounds.244  A commentator at the 
forefront of the issue was Professor Robert C. Ellickson, who argued that 
the goal of land use controls from an economic efficiency standpoint was to 
minimize “the sum of nuisance costs, prevention costs, and administrative 
costs.”245  From that premise, Ellickson concluded that zoning would 
“inevitably result[] in considerable prevention and administrative costs”—
meaning it must result in large reductions in nuisance costs to be 
efficient.246  From Ellickson’s perspective, this is unlikely because market 
allocations of land could just as effectively reduce nuisance costs as a 
zoning system; however, the zoning system runs the danger of the zoning 
drafters attempting to eliminate all nuisance costs.247  Perhaps 
counterintuitively, it is not desirable for zoning drafters to eliminate all 
nuisance costs because doing so will impose higher direct and indirect costs 
on the whole population than benefits on the select few the zoning 
ordinance is intended to protect.248  From these observations, Ellickson 
concluded that mandatory standards in zoning are costly, but such costs 
could be reduced if zoning prohibitions could be lifted by damage 
payments.249  Ellickson endorsed contract and condition zoning as two 
ways of allowing for prohibitions to be lifted by damage payments.250 
Professor Lee Anne Fennell also found economic support for bargained-
for zoning.251  Fennell argued that because zoning law is usually based on 
the subjective views of a political majority, it is unlikely to provide an 
efficient initial allocation of entitlements between the landowner and the 
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community.252  Furthermore, Fennell acknowledged that if the interest 
group theory of government is accepted, the initial allocation of property 
rights might diverge even further from the social optimum.253  Therefore, 
whether the law represents the subjective view of a majority or an interest 
group, it is unlikely to allocate property rights at the socially optimal level.  
However, according to Fennell, Pareto superior254 improvements from this 
original poor allocation can be achieved through bargaining.255  To 
illustrate this point, Fennell imagines a market setting where the efficient 
allocation point is where the marginal cost to the landowner equals the 
marginal benefit to the community at large.256  The way to achieve said 
equilibrium point is through a bargaining process where the land use 
“winner” can compensate the “losers.”257  Thus, Fennell supports 
bargained-for zoning as a way to make Pareto superior improvements to the 
suboptimal initial allocation. 
Professor Jennifer G. Brown, then writing as a student, also endorsed the 
Fennell view.258  Brown argued that a restrictive zoning classification could 
impose costs on a landowner that exceed potential damage to the 
community from a rezoning of the landowner’s property.259  Brown 
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asserted that contract zoning, on the other hand, “overcomes this sort of 
inefficiency by giving the landowner the chance to develop the land more 
intensively and bear the costs that may result from the more intensive 
development.”260 
2.  Acceptance of the Trend:  Chrismon 
Courts in several states have started to accept the economic rationale.261  
The leading case embracing this position is Chrismon v. Guilford 
County.262  In Chrismon, one of the defendants had been operating a 
business consisting of storing and selling grain and selling and distributing 
chemicals on a tract of land adjacent to his residence since 1948.263  In 
1964, Guilford County adopted a zoning ordinance, which zoned the 
property as “A-1 Agricultural.”264  The storage and sale of grain was 
permitted under the new classification, but the sale and distribution of 
agricultural chemicals was not.265  However, because the activity preexisted 
the ordinance, the nonconforming use was allowed, but that element of the 
business could not be expanded.266  The plaintiffs in the case bought land 
next to an additional tract of land owned by the defendant.267  In 1980, the 
defendant expanded his activities onto the land next to the plaintiffs’, and 
the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Guilford County Inspections 
Department.268  The defendant responded by requesting that the County 
rezone the property to “Conditional Use Industrial District.”269  After 
holding a public hearing concerning the matter, the Guilford County Board 
of Commissioners voted to rezone the property as requested.270  The 
plaintiffs immediately filed suit alleging, among other things, that the 
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County’s actions constituted contract zoning.271  The trial court held that it 
did not constitute contract zoning, but the appellate court held that it did.272  
The Supreme Court of North Carolina considered the matter and 
concluded the court of appeals decision “virtually outlaw[ed]” conditional 
zoning, thus making it appropriate to address its legality in North 
Carolina.273  The court engaged in a discussion of the benefits of 
conditional zoning, namely that “it permits a given local authority greater 
flexibility in balancing conflicting demands.”274  While acknowledging the 
potential concerns,275 the court adopted conditional zoning in North 
Carolina and argued that conditional zoning, “when properly implemented, 
will add a valuable and desirable flexibility to the planning efforts of local 
authorities throughout [the] state.”276  Later in the decision, the court 
explained its distinction between contract and conditional zoning, namely 
that conditional zoning is a unilateral transaction while contract zoning is a 
bilateral transaction.  It further explained that conditional zoning preserves 
the local zoning authority’s decision-making authority, while in contract 
zoning it abandons that authority by binding itself to the agreement.277  The 
Chrismon court therefore adopted conditional zoning for its greater 
flexibility, while drawing the common distinction from contract zoning.278  
Other courts have, like the Chrismon court, found that conditional zoning 
provides needed flexibility and efficiency while still preserving the state’s 
police power.279 
B.  Jurisdictions That Openly Permit Both 
As stated earlier, the distinction between conditional and contract zoning 
may be in name only;280 however, at least two states, including Washington 
and Maine, openly permit both.281  In City of Redmond v. Kezner,282 the 
Supreme Court of Washington held that a “concomitant agreement 
contain[ed] no express promise by the city to rezone.”283  The court noted, 
however, that the distinction for the purposes of validity was 
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unimportant.284  As the Supreme Court of Washington explained in 
Chrobuck v. Snohomish County,285 “concomitant agreement[s] provide[] a 
source of flexibility by allowing an intermediate use permit, between 
absolute denial and complete approval of the petition.”286  In other words, 
the court felt a zoning ordinance should only be declared invalid if it could 
be shown that there was no valid reason for the change, if it was clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, or if the city was using the concomitant 
agreement solely for the benefit of private speculators.287 
Maine has opted to permit both conditional and contract zoning by 
statute.288  The Maine statute requires the planning board to conduct a 
public hearing on a developer’s proposed contract zoning agreement and to 
provide notice of this hearing to the public and the neighboring 
landowners.289 
It has also been suggested that Nebraska accepts both conditional and 
contract zoning.290  The leading Nebraska case is Giger v. City of 
Omaha.291  In Giger, the Midlands Development Co. purchased property 
and sought a rezoning classification to allow it to establish a mixed 
residential/commercial project on the property.292  Midlands successfully 
negotiated four separate agreements with the city, collectively known as the 
“the development agreement.”293  After the city was hesitant to grant the 
rezoning application, Midlands offered nineteen acres of its land as 
parkland, but the planning board still rejected the offer.294  Midlands then 
bettered its offer, this time offering to donate twenty-five acres and to 
contribute over 400,000 dollars for “certain off-site public street 
improvements.”295  This offer was accepted by the planning board but 
rejected by the City Council.296  Eager to have the rezoning completed, 
Midlands met with City Councilman David Stahmer, an opponent of the 
project, in an attempt to convince him to support the project.297  Stahmer 
agreed to change his vote in exchange for Midlands donating thirty-six 
acres as parkland and promising to “locate all future residential buildings 
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not be] illegal under the Mhyre rationale in which the city promised to rezone.”). 
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outside the flood plain.”298  Midlands accepted this arrangement and the 
City Council approved the rezoning.299  Neighboring landowners brought 
suit asserting that the rezoning agreement constituted illegal contract 
rezoning.300  The court upheld the rezoning and determined that a “city 
should be permitted to condition rezoning ordinances on the adoption of an 
agreement between the developer and the city.”301  In order to avoid 
confusion, the court opted to refer to this rezoning arrangement as 
“conditional zoning,” although the agreement was bilateral.302 
C.  Jurisdictions That Permit Neither 
Some jurisdictions permit neither contract nor conditional zoning.303  
Two jurisdictions that consistently prohibit contract and conditional zoning 
are Connecticut304 and Pennsylvania.305 
The leading Connecticut case against contract and conditional zoning is 
Bartsch v. Planning & Zoning Commission.306  In Bartsch, abutting 
landowners appealed from a Town Commission’s grant of a zone change to 
allow construction of a medical office building in what had been a 
residential zone.307  The court ruled that the commission had “grossly 
violated the statutory uniformity requirement by requiring . . . that a buffer 
zone be created between the property at issue and the surrounding 
properties as a prerequisite to its approval of a zone change.”308  Although 
the court declined to rule on the conditional zoning challenge, its holding 
has been interpreted as requiring “that zone changes may be conditionally 
granted only when regulations authorize conditions to be imposed in 
specific circumstances, and when the regulations are uniformly applied.”309 
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The leading Pennsylvania case is Carlino v. Whitpain Investors.310  In 
Carlino, a developer was constructing an apartment complex across from 
the appellant’s residence.311  In 1973, the township had agreed to rezone the 
property from a single-family classification to a multifamily classification; 
however, unbeknownst to the appellants, in 1978 the township had included 
a provision that required an access road to a major highway also be built.312  
The appellants sought an injunction alleging that the original rezoning was 
contractually conditioned on there being no access road.313  The court 
declined to uphold conditional zoning, reiterating that “individuals cannot, 
by contract, abridge police powers which protect the general welfare and 
public interest.”314 
The courts in Connecticut, therefore, are concerned with the lack of 
uniformity in contract and conditional zoning, while the Pennsylvania 
courts are concerned with the state bargaining away its police powers. 
D.  Jurisdictions That Have Declined To Rule on the Issue 
North Dakota,315 Arkansas,316 and Indiana317 have declined to rule on the 
issue.  North Dakota recently did so in Hector v. City of Fargo.318  In 
Hector, the appellants submitted a request to rezone land classified as 
“agricultural” to “‘general commercial,’ which would allow the land to be 
used for retail, service, office and commercial uses.”319  The appellant’s 
initial request sought to change a total of approximately 145 acres of 
land.320  City representatives voiced concerns with the initial request—
mainly how it might affect road access points, utility easements, and 
construction issues.321  In response to these concerns, the appellants 
submitted a revised application that requested that approximately 132 acres 
be rezoned.322  City officials expressed concerns about the second plan 
regarding storm water retention, and in response the appellants offered a 
third plan that requested that approximately 128 acres be rezoned.323  The 
third plan was submitted to the staff of the City of Fargo Planning 
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Department, which ultimately recommended that the City Commission 
reject the rezoning request.324  The City Commission held a public hearing 
and decided that, although the Planning Department staff had been 
generally supportive of commercial expansion, neighborhood opposition 
recommended denial of the request, and therefore the request was denied.325  
On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the appellants argued that 
the city engaged in illegal contract zoning by having the initial negotiations 
with them.326  While noting that contract zoning is generally illegal 
throughout the country and that the court had never ruled on contract 
zoning in North Dakota, the court declined to set North Dakota precedent 
on the issue in the case as it held there was “no instance of contract zoning 
between the City of Fargo and the Hectors.”327 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas also declined to rule on the legality of 
contract zoning in Murphy v. City of West Memphis.328  In Murphy, a 
company wanted to sell fireworks within the city, but an ordinance made 
doing so illegal.329  A competitor company was exempt from the ordinance 
because it had been grandfathered in.330  The prohibited company filed suit 
against the city, and at a public hearing the company agreed to dismiss the 
lawsuit if the city voted in favor of an ordinance allowing it to sell 
fireworks at a specified location.331  The city passed several zoning 
ordinances to allow this, and the ordinances were subsequently challenged 
as contract zoning.332  The trial court found that the only reason the city 
passed the zoning ordnances was to settle the lawsuit, but held that that was 
acceptable if the ordinances were passed through a bona fide zoning 
procedure.333  The supreme court agreed and found that, although contract 
zoning was an issue of first impression for Arkansas, none of the 
circumstances that traditionally give rise to contract zoning were present 
and therefore declined to hold on the legality of contract zoning in the 
case.334 
Indiana has most recently declined to rule on the legality of contract 
zoning in Ogden v. Premier Properties, USA, Inc.335  In Ogden the City 
Council voted to rezone certain property from residential to commercial.336  
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The developer had filed a request to rezone the property four years 
earlier.337  That request was recommended for denial by the Area Plan 
Commission and was subsequently denied by the City Council.338  The 
developer then filed another two requests to rezone the property but each 
was denied.339  All of the requests “included a use and development 
commitment . . . which placed restrictions and requirements on the 
proposed development.”340  The City Council considered the developer’s 
latest request at a hearing where the developer “introduced a document 
titled ‘Covenant’ that contained written commitments ‘in addition to the 
covenants set forth in the Use and Development Commitment.’”341  The 
commitments were conditioned on the City Council approving the request 
and were binding on the developer for twenty years.342  The City Council 
subsequently voted in favor of the rezoning request.343  Neighboring 
landowners filed suit alleging, among other claims, that the rezoning 
constituted illegal contract zoning.344   
The court noted that it had never ruled on the legality of contract zoning 
and declined to do so.345  The court based its decision on Prock v. Town of 
Danville,346 where it had previously declined to rule on the legality of 
contract zoning.347  In Prock, the Town was a party to the agreement and 
the court still declined to rule on contract zoning.348  Here, the town was not 
a party to the agreement, making the case for contract zoning significantly 
weaker.349  Furthermore, as in Prock, the rezoning was approved before the 
agreement became effective, meaning it was impossible for the town to 
have contracted away its police power.350  Based on these facts, the court 
found it unwise to rule on the legality of contract zoning at that time.351 
IV.  EITHER PROHIBIT BOTH CONTRACT AND CONDITIONAL ZONING OR 
HEIGHTEN THE STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The conflicting positions of some courts,352 as well as others’ hesitation 
to rule on the issue,353 demonstrates an overall confusion regarding the 
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implications of contract and conditional zoning.  This part begins by 
applying public choice principles to the problem and then recommends two 
solutions for conflicted states.  The first solution is to outlaw both contract 
and conditional zoning because of their vulnerability to public choice 
concerns.  The second solution recognizes that contract and conditional 
zoning may provide needed flexibility to the zoning process and, therefore, 
recommends that jurisdictions that opt to permit them apply a Fasano-like 
standard of judicial review when evaluating the decisions in court. 
A.  Public Choice and Contract/Conditional Zoning 
Both contract and conditional zoning are highly vulnerable to capture by 
interest groups.  Because both provide legislators with a wide range of 
discretion in what they bargain for,354 it is likely legislators will opt to 
bargain for conditions favored by influential interest groups in the 
locality.355  The high level of discretion makes contract and conditional 
zoning more susceptible to agency capture than Euclidean zoning.  
Euclidean zoning, due to its uniformity and lack of discretion,356 is only 
vulnerable to capture during the drafting of the original zoning allocation.  
Once the allocation is set, it is far more costly for interest groups to lobby 
for a change to the entire code than it is to lobby for a particular contractual 
condition on an individual parcel.357  Even accepting Professors Farber and 
Frickey’s argument that ideology plays a major role in legislative 
decisions,358 legislators are still likely to appease interest groups so long as 
those groups’ views are consistent with their ideological outlook.   
Both scenarios are concerning for two reasons.  First, acting to appease 
interest groups can often result in inefficient and burdensome regulations, 
or lack thereof, that do not serve the interests of the public at large.359  And 
second, even though interest group lobbying may have beneficial results,360 
contract and conditional zoning allow legislators to use the zoning system 
for purposes outside its intended purpose.  The intended function of zoning, 
as the Hanna court eloquently stated, was “to ensure an orderly physical 
development of the city, borough, township or other community by 
confining particular uses of property to certain defined areas.”361  While it 
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is undoubtedly true that SZEA envisions broader purposes of zoning, these 
purposes are still consistent with a desire to make decisions that improve 
the general welfare of the community at large, not influential interest 
groups.362  So, while it is certainly possible that appeasing influential 
interest groups may lead to improvements in the general welfare of the 
community at large, there is no guarantee this will be the case, and making 
it easier for legislators to act without that purpose only increases the 
likelihood that rezoning decisions will not be made consistent with the 
intended goals of zoning. 
It is also unlikely that the distinctions drawn by courts regarding the 
difference between conditional and contract zoning will provide a 
solution.363  Courts draw the distinction based on whether the municipality 
has entered into a bilateral or unilateral contract,364 or whether it has lost its 
independent decision-making power.365  But, from a public choice 
perspective neither distinction is relevant.  The former distinction still 
allows for legislators to engage in a bargaining process and negotiate for 
conditions they feel interest groups desire.  The latter distinction, while of 
constitutional importance, is unrelated to public choice issues and, 
therefore, beyond the scope of this Note.   
Both the Giger case and the Durand case provide evidence of likely 
agency capture in the unilateral contract realm.  Recall in Giger, Midlands 
had to directly negotiate with Councilman Stahmer, and Stahmer did not 
agree to vote for the rezoning until Midlands agreed to his set of 
conditions.366  The individualized discretion Stahmer enjoyed in the 
negotiation process would have allowed him to advocate for virtually any 
condition he felt appropriate.  Further recall in Durand, the Town 
Administrator made IDC aware that the town was eight million dollars short 
of what it needed to construct a new school, and only after IDC publicly 
promised to donate eight million dollars to the town did the town vote to 
rezone the property.367  This is not to say that the community did not 
benefit from the new parkland in the Giger case or that a new school did not 
benefit the community in the Durand case, but the discretion given to 
individual legislators, or a small group of legislators, makes it far too easy 
to appease the wishes of interest groups. 
Furthermore, courts that have expressed concerns with contract and 
conditional zoning have not done so in the public choice context.  
Connecticut has expressed concerns due to its statutory uniformity 
requirement,368 while Pennsylvania has done so due to fears of bargaining 
away the police power.369  While this Note ultimately advocates for the 
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same conclusion reached by the courts in Connecticut and Pennsylvania, it 
is important for courts to reach that conclusion acknowledging public 
choice concerns.  In Connecticut, all it will take is for the legislature to 
amend the uniformity requirement to allow at least conditional zoning.  In 
Pennsylvania, courts could choose to change course and adopt the modern 
trend to uphold conditional zoning because the practice does not necessarily 
bargain away the police power.  Rooting the analysis in public choice 
concerns would provide a stronger resistance to contract and conditional 
zoning in the states going forward. 
Courts that feared contract and conditional zoning due to the potential for 
abuse and corruption were on the right track.370  But, they too missed the 
overall point.  As stated earlier, public choice and corruption are not one 
and the same.371  By writing in the language of corruption, courts gave 
proponents of contract and conditional zoning an easy response: corruption 
can be dealt with through prosecution, institutional reforms, and more 
effective policing.372  Stating the fears in terms of public choice makes 
them more difficult to overcome.373  If self-interested legislators are an 
inherent part of the system,374 then laws within the system will have to 
acknowledge that reality. 
Finally, voters cannot be trusted as an adequate check on legislators from 
appeasing interest groups.  The rational-ignorance effect suggests that 
voters simply will not devote the adequate amount of time and attention to 
educate themselves on local issues.375  That limitation allows for local 
legislators to appease interest groups without the majority of the voting 
population even being aware of it.  While Fischel does raise a strong 
theoretical counter argument,376 the empirical evidence cuts against him.377  
Furthermore, it may be appropriate to view neighborhood associations as an 
interest group, and doing so leads to the conclusion that they are an 
influential group, particularly in the zoning context.378  Even if the majority 
was educated on local issues and not viewed as an interest group, it is 
unlikely that it would be able to organize and effectively petition the local 
government for favorable change due to the collective action problem.379  
Free-riding concerns make it unlikely that a large group of individuals will 
be able to effectively organize since it is easy to reap the benefits of 
someone else’s activity without paying for those benefits.380 
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Analyzing contract and conditional zoning through a public choice lens 
makes clear that none of the differing views on the issue satisfy public 
choice concerns.  This Note therefore proposes two new solutions to the 
conflict. 
B.  Solution One:  Prohibit Both Contract and Conditional Zoning 
The first, and optimal, solution is to prohibit both contract and 
conditional zoning and to do so citing public choice concerns.  Prohibiting 
both contract and conditional zoning would take away dangerous discretion 
from legislators,381 and therefore make it more difficult for interest groups 
to capture the rezoning process.  Doing so citing public choice concerns 
would acknowledge the realities of the system and make law accordingly.  
It would mean a more general return to rigid Euclidean zoning that was not 
intended to be open to discretionary changes often.382  This, however, may 
be too impractical given the contemporary need for flexibility in zoning.383  
As Professors Ellickson, Fennell, and Brown accurately observe, rigid 
zoning procedures will likely result in inefficient allocations of land 
rights.384   
The counter to that problem, as first observed by Professor Coase,385 and 
subsequently adopted by Ellickson,386 Fennell,387 and Brown,388 is to allow 
for a system of bargaining that will likely lead to Pareto superior 
improvements.  While the bargaining model has some criticisms—namely 
the Hayekian critique that legislators lack the necessary information needed 
to know when a Pareto superior improvement has been made,389 and that 
legislators are likely bargaining not as representatives of the public, but as 
representatives of themselves and the interest groups that better their odds 
at reelection390—its general logic is strong and is accepted by many 
commentators and jurisdictions alike.391  Furthermore, the critiques lend 
themselves to the more radical solution of outlawing zoning altogether, as 
the Hayekian criticism suggests that legislators will inevitably misallocate 
resources in the initial zoning plan, and the public choice criticism suggests 
that legislators will draft the initial zoning plan in accordance with what 
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interest groups want.392  While outlawing zoning completely should not be 
dismissed outright, the implications of such a decision are beyond the scope 
of this Note.393  The next section will therefore suggest an alternate solution 
that is consistent with both flexibility and public choice concerns. 
C.  Solution Two:  Allow Contract and Conditional Zoning but 
Apply a Stricter Fasano-like Standard of Review 
The alternate conclusion is to allow contract and conditional zoning, but 
to apply a stricter standard of review that is shaped after Fasano.  The 
benefit of the Fasano standard is that it allows legislators the needed 
flexibility to make Pareto superior improvements to the zoning code, while 
acknowledging the quasi-judicial nature of rezoning and monitoring for 
abuse accordingly.394  As was recognized by the court in Cooper, voters are 
an inadequate check on the legislature, particularly in the rezoning context, 
because they are “unaware or unconcerned” with such decisions.395  The 
judiciary, by contrast, is well suited to engage in an extensive review 
process of discretionary decisions of this matter.396  The responses to 
Fasano by the courts in Wait and Cabana are both grounded in precedent 
and therefore have failed to openly consider contemporary realities of local 
zoning boards and voters.397  Courts should acknowledge and consider the 
realities of interest group involvement in zoning,398 the relative ease with 
which interest groups can capture the discretionary processes of contract 
and conditional zoning, and the fact that voters have little incentive to 
actively monitor local politics.399 Acknowledging these considerations 
leads to the conclusions of the courts in Fasano, Cooper, and Snyder:  
rezoning decisions have to be subject to higher levels of review. 
In order to apply the Fasano standard to contract and conditional zoning, 
courts should specifically look for instances where evidence of agency 
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capture appears present,400 such as those in Giger, Durand, and Hector 
where legislators actively negotiate for terms different than those originally 
proposed.  While this Note, like Fasano, does not suggest an “absolute 
standard[] or mechanical test[],”401 it does suggest a general approach that 
places the burden of proof on the zoning board to show that the rezoning is 
consistent with the intended purposes of zoning and is not motivated by 
interest group lobbying.  While this standard will undoubtedly make 
contract and conditional zoning more costly, and perhaps even lead to 
municipalities avoiding the practices completely, the dangers of making 
desirable change more difficult are outweighed by the dangers of interest 
group capture of the zoning process.402  Courts should also ignore whether 
a legislative or administrative body made the contract or conditional 
rezoning decision, as both are subject to the same general public choice 
concerns caused by self-interest.403  Doing so will also deprive 
administrative acts in contract and conditional zoning of the presumption of 
validity.404 
This solution addresses the concerns of all sides of the conflict.  Those 
states and commentators that feel contract and conditional zoning are too 
beneficial to give up will be able to keep the procedure.405  States like 
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, that worry that contract and conditional 
zoning are inconsistent with statutory uniformity requirements or bargain 
away the police power,406 as well as historical decisions that feared 
corruption and favoritism,407 will have a mechanism through which to make 
sure that the particulars of the rezoning are not nonuniform, do not bargain 
way the police power, and were not the product of corruption, while not 
losing out on the benefits that the procedures provide.408  And for states that 
have yet to decide on the issue, this solution could provide a middle ground 
on which they are comfortable operating.409 
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CONCLUSION 
The law has, in large part, ignored the realities of human nature as 
observed by the public choice theorists and instead has opted to rely on a 
false and romantic vision of lawmakers.  Contract and conditional zoning 
are two areas in which this romantic vision has led to jurisdictions failing to 
recognize the danger.  This Note has advocated, first and foremost, that 
jurisdictions acknowledge these realities and craft legislation accordingly. 
In the contract and conditional zoning realm, this acknowledgement 
suggests one of two solutions.  Either, both contract and conditional zoning 
should be prohibited completely to avoid self-interested legislators using 
the system to appease interest groups at the expense of the general public.  
Or, if the efficiency gains made by contract and conditional zoning are too 
strong to forego, then courts should review these decisions under a Fasano-
like standard of review that instructs judges to look for agency capture. 
